Abstract. In this paper we address the problem of large space consumption for protocols in the Bounded Retrieval Model (BRM), which require users to store large secret keys subject to adversarial leakage. We propose a method to derive keys for such protocols on-the-fly from weakly random private data (like text documents or photos, users keep on their disks anyway for noncryptographic purposes) in such a way that no extra storage is needed. We prove that any leakage-resilient protocol (belonging to a certain, arguably quite broad class) when run with a key obtained this way retains a similar level of security as the original protocol had. Additionally, we guarantee privacy of the data the actual keys are derived from. That is, an adversary can hardly gain any knowledge about the private data except that he could otherwise obtain via leakage. Our reduction works in the Random Oracle model. As an important tool in the proof we use a newly established bound for min-entropy, which can be of independent interest. It may be viewed as an analogue of the chain rule -a weaker form of the well-known formula H(X|Y ) = H(X, Y ) − H(Y ) for random variables X, Y , and Shannon entropy, which our result originates from. For min-entropy only a much more limited version of this relation is known to hold. Namely, the min-entropy of X may decrease by up to the bitlength of Y when X is conditioned on Y , in short: H∞(X|Y ) ≥ H∞(X) − |Y |. In many cases this inequality does not offer tight bounds, and such significant entropy loss makes it inadequate for our particular application. In the quasi chain rule we propose, we inject some carefully crafted side information (spoiling knowledge) to show that with large probability the average min-entropy of X conditioned on both: Y and this side information can be almost lower bounded by the min-entropy of (X, Y ) decreased by the min-entropy of Y conditioned on the side information.
Introduction

Key derivation from sensitive data
In this paper we make an attempt to adapt the problem of overcoming weak expectations, which recently has attracted considerable attention in the cryptographic community [2, 11, 28] , to yet another well-recognized setting -the Bounded Retrieval Model (BRM) [7, 12] . Here, the term weak expectations refers to the (expected) chances of breaking a cryptosystem when an imperfect source of randomness is employed in places where uniformly random bits were supposed to be used. For instance, one can quantify security of a system with semi-random keys used instead of keys drawn from uniform distribution. What motivates such analysis is that the standard assumption about unlimited availability of truly random bits turns out to be overoptimistic in practice. On the other hand, cheap sources of weak randomness can be easily found "in nature". Suffice it to mention physical sources or biometric data [4, 9] , which remain somewhat unpredictable for adversaries.
In the conventional approach to cryptography, security of a scheme relies on privacy of cryptographic keys. The dawn of so called side channel attacks has influenced this perspective significantly. There, an adversary may gain some partial knowledge about the secret keys, e.g., by measuring timings [19] , power consumption [20] , electromagnetic radiation [24] , or even sounds (acoustic cryptoanalysis) [15] emitted by a device a cryptographic protocol is implemented on. Leakage-resilient cryptosystems are meant to address attacks of this form and remain secure when the adversary is allowed to adaptively learn arbitrary functions of the secret keys subject to only one restriction -namely, the total length of information leaked in the process must not exceed a leakage bound λ. There are in fact two slightly different models of leakage considered in the literature. The relative leakage allows λ to be some fraction of the length of a secret key. In the absolute leakage setting, also known as the BRM [14] , the parameter λ is fixed in the first place, and then the length of a key may be chosen accordingly, depending on λ, to achieve the desired level of security. It is important to note that this flexibility in increasing the key size does not affect other parameters possibly present in a BRM protocol, such as computation or communication complexity -these should only depend on a security parameter but not on λ.
Space-efficient BRM The leakage bound λ and, consequently, the size of a key in the BRM are typically very large, the latter being of order of gigabytes. Although per-gigabyte storage cost is becoming lower every year, this downside of BRM protocols may still be an issue, e.g., for many mobile devices with quite limited size of non-volatile memory available. When combined with the fact that keys used in these protocols are required to be sufficiently random, it means that computers running a BRM protocol are clogged with some huge blob of random and otherwise useless data. In the solution we propose, BRM keys can be derived on-the-fly (that is, it is not necessary to keep them on disk, and they may be computed when a relevant portion of the key is requested) from data a user want to store on his disk for any other reason. The private user data usable in this context may include: text documents, photos, audio files, or other media. This may lessen the problem of wasted disk space however for a reduced space we trade in additional computations needed to determine BRM keys.
Sensitive data Building a cryptographic protocol on top of randomness derived from private data bears an obvious risk of compromising that data. One can imagine an artificial protocol that simply publishes all accessible randomness. Also, a protocol in the BRM does not necessarily guarantee protection of its key. Some fragments of a BRM key may be passed, as a part of normal operating procedure, to an honest party that did not possess the key in the first place. To give an example illustrating such a situation, one can conceive of an authentication protocol in the BRM, which itself appears to be folklore, based on Merkle tree [21] . There, a hash tree is built on an input BRM key and the resulting hash from the root is then forwarded to a verifier (say, a bank). This way a user can commit to his key which, in its entirety, is only stored on user's side for efficiency reasons. On the other hand, the verifier may learn parts of the key when the user attempts to authenticate himself. In order to do that, the verifier demands to present hashes along some path of his choice in the Merkle tree. Such a path includes data from the initial BRM key and thus its fragment gets revealed to the verifier. Now, if a BRM key used in this protocol is obtained from data stored on disk then, clearly, the key derivation procedure should enjoy some kind of a one-wayness property. If the procedure does not hide its input then a dishonest verifier may attempt to recover the underlying data or, at least, he may gain some partial knowledge. In this paper, we aim at a solution that allows a user to protect his private and possibly sensitive data in this scenario. Namely, we require that an adversary can hardly learn anything more about the data except that he could otherwise achieve via leakage.
Overview of our solution Seemingly, the problem of extracting an almost random key from sufficiently random data can be easily solved, even in presence of leakage, using a well-known primitive -namely, an average-case strong randomness extractor. Its definition requires that for any two random variables X and I (where I can be viewed as side information about I, i.e., a leak) such that the (conditional) min-entropy of X given I (see (1) for a precise definition of conditional min-entropy) is high enough, then the output of the extractor Ext(X, R) is statistically close to uniform even given a short random seed R and the side information I, in short: Ext(X, R), R, I ≈ (U, R, I). Dodis et al. [9] extend the LHL to show that universal hash functions constitute good aveon-rage-case extractors retaining nearly the same parameters as in the original LHL. We also note that the definition of such extractors is enough to cover the privacy requirement in our particular application -if Ext(X, R) disclosed some information about private data X then by setting I to be this information we would produce a correlation between Ext(X, R) and I, thus violating the condition about Ext(X, R) being close to uniform and independent of I. Overall, randomness extractors allows us to cover the two main properties we aim at in this paper, i.e., the uniformity of keys and the privacy of underlying data. However, such a construction would be downright impractical. From the computational point of view, extractors are not suited best to work on inputs as huge as in our application. Also, they are inherently non-local in the sense that each bit of an output should depend on almost every bit of an input. This means that in order to compute even a small portion of the derived key on demand using an extractor, one has to read and supply almost the whole input data which is not a viable option.
To address the issue related to efficiency and locality, we propose a different way of deriving keys from private data. Our idea is quite straightforward -it boils down to splitting all the data into consecutive blocks of the same fixed length n (say, n = 4kB). A block could naturally correspond to the smallest allocation unit in a filesystem present on a user's device. Then, we use hashing to extract randomness from blocks. The naïve method to implement it would be computing hashes block by block. This approach, albeit simple, has a significant drawback. The only assumption we make about the input data is that its joint min-entropy is not too small (this measures the a priori knowledge of the adversary about the private data, before leakage is taken into account). We do not demand however that the randomness is equidistributed across all the blocks. Therefore, it may happen that even for high overall min-entropy, e.g., 1 2 n where is the number of blocks, there exist /2 blocks which, from the adversary's point of view, are constant. Consequently, the corresponding parts of a derived key carry no randomness at all and are known to the adversary.
We circumvent the problem caused by blocks with low min-entropy we increase the number of blocks a single block of a derived key depends on. That is, each hash is calculated by taking not one but d blocks of input. Additionally, we amplify the likelihood of the event that there is at least one high min-entropy block among the selected d-tuple. This step actually introduces a new flavor to the reasoning. Namely, we argue the assumption on joint min-entropy of the input blocks with large probability implies that there exists a large number of blocks each having high min-entropy. This statement may seem rather natural and intuitive yet it is somewhat tricky to prove. A related problem of extracting random blocks was considered before by Nisan and Zuckerman [23] and Alwen, Dodis, and Wichs [1] .
The fact that there should be plenty of sufficiently random blocks in the input allows us to pick d-tuples of block randomly. However, to recreate portions of the derived on-the-fly one would have to store the auxiliary randomness used to select those tuples, which may not be acceptable. Instead, we suggest employing dispersers -d-regular bipartite graphs with the property that any sufficiently large set of vertices on the left side is connected to almost all vertices on the right side. Every such a disperser induces a selection of d-tuples.
Clearly, increasing the degree of regularity d of a disperser reduces locality of the key derivation method. This however comes as a trade-off. We use a simulationbased argument to prove that any protocol using the derived key can be simulated by a protocol operating on an original key with O(n /d) of additional leakage.
Chain rule for min-entropy
Since the beginning of formal treatment of cryptography most works have heavily relied on different flavours of entropy. Depending on the context, those notions are used to measure compressibility, unpredictability or uncertainty of outcomes of random processes. In his seminal work Shannon applied the simplest, compressibility notion of entropy (called after his name), i.e., the one defined by
Pr(X=x) to prove that in a perfectly secure symmetric key encryption scheme the length of the key is necessarily as large as the length of the message. The notion which turned out to be even more useful in the area of cryptography is min-entropy defined by the formula H ∞ (X) def = − log(max x Pr(X = x)) and encompassing unpredictability properties of a random variable X.
Conditional entropy Shannon's entropy possesses a natural generalization to its conditional version H(X|Y ) which satisfies the formula H(X, Y ) = H(X|Y )+H(Y ). This corresponds to an intuitive interpretation stating that the information contained in (X, Y ) consists of the information in Y extended by the conditional information in X given Y . Dodis et al. [9] provided an analogous notion for min-entropy. Namely, for two random variables X, Y the conditional min-entropy H ∞ (X|Y ) is given by the formula:
This definition turns out to preserve the natural interpretation of min-entropy as maximal probability of success in guessing X given Y , i.e., for any algorithm A we have:
Regrettably, the above definition possesses serious drawbacks explained in the following example.
Example 1 (Cross distribution). Let
n ) 2 be a random variable distributed uniformly over "the cross", i.e., a set {0, 1}
n × e ∪ e × {0, 1} n for some fixed e ∈ {0, 1} n . Note that, we have H ∞ (X 1 , X 2 ) = − log 1 2 n+1 −1 ∈ [n, n + 1] and H ∞ (X i ) = − log 2 n 2 n+1 −1 < 1 and therefore, the sum property does not hold without any further assumptions or conditions. Moreover, H ∞ (X 2 |X 1 ) < H ∞ (X 2 ) and therefore H ∞ (X 2 |X 1 ) + H ∞ (X 1 ) < 2 which consequently means that the most natural chain rule does not hold either.
The authors also prove the following result. 
The above item b) of Lemma 1 is treated as chain rule for min-entropy. Its significant weakness is that the inequality does not depend on the random properties of Y but its actual size λ. We illustrate this by a simple example.
Example 2 (Two blocks almost half entropy).
Let X, Y be two random variables distributed over {0, 1}
n with joint distribution of min-entropy H ∞ (X, Y ) = n. Then, the above item b) gives us a trivial estimate
Nevertheless, if we condition (X 1 , X 2 ) given in Example 1 with a random variable Hint defined by the formula
then the second variable X 3−i has conditional min-entropy H ∞ (X 3−i |Hint = i) = n. Therefore, there exists a certain additional "knowledge" Hint which allows us to extract almost whole min-entropy from the pair (X 1 , X 2 ). Namely, the event
holds with probability 1 over the choice of i. This suggests that the right way to obtain the chain rule is additional conditioning. Similar approach was used in certain different applications and is classically called spoiling knowledge. Remark 1. We believe that our results might find a meaningful application in the theory of extractors as we exhibit a certain (non-strict) block-wise structure of any distribution of high min-entropy (cf. proof of the Claim inside Corollary 2). Blockwise distributions are widely used in theory of extractors (see, e.g., [22] ).
Previous results concerning chain rule. Previous research concerning (or somehow related) to chain rule is not only mentioned in discussed above [9] . For example authors of [1] and [23] prove that random (sufficiently large) subtuple of some set of variables with high min-entropy must preserve some significant amount of this entropy. Our result can be viewed as a generalization of this fact since from our reasoning we get that some specific (not random) subtuple preserves some minentropy. (see Corollary 2.) Moreover in [23] authors try to deal with the problem of chain rule for min-entropy but need to make big effort to get some complicated workaround since they do not have any quasi chain rule for min-entropy in hand.
Moreover, they show a simplified version of their result and give a short brief proof based on chain rule for Shannon entropy.
Another important previous result is Lemma A.1 (min-entropy split) from [5] (and also other variants from [8, 27] ). Here authors formulate a theorem that also can be viewed as a quasi chain rule. As an example compare with the following: 
This is very interesting result that shows that it is possible to extract partial minentropy from a pair of variables. However authors justify high min-entropy of just one viariable from the pair. In our result we get significantly more dealing with both variables at once. See Lemma 3 for details.
Our contribution
The results of the paper are twofold.
Making BRM space efficient. In this paper, we give a new idea to overcome a problem with large space requirements in the BRM model. As a reminder: BRM uses huge private keys for purpose of leakage-resiliency. Here we describe an idea to derive secret key from private data (this could include text documents, videos, etc.). That content is supposed to have high enough min-entropy, however it raises a problem with privacy: we do not want to reveal any sensitive data outside. Our construction fulfills this expectation. So the private data remains undisclosed even if the entire derived key is compromised.
The secret key is being computed on-the-fly from private data so that no extra memory is used to store the key. Access to the key is fast so one does need to read limited portion of private data to compute some part of the secret key.
The main result shows that any cryptographic protocol from well defined and vast class (intuitively: game based protocols) is still secure if we use a key derived from private data in place of a random key.
Chain rule through spoiling knowledge. The reasoning from Section 1.2 exhibits a pair of random variables X, E such that H ∞ (X|E = e) + H ∞ (Y |E = e) H ∞ (X) + H ∞ (Y ) with probability 1 over the choice of e. Analogous simplified situations were investigated by Bennett et al. [3] for collision entropy H 2 and utilized in privacy amplification. Furthermore, similar examples also exists for other Renyi entropies H α for α > 1 and were systematically analysed by Cachin in [6] in context of smooth entropy. Our methods substantially generalize "profiling" method of Cachin and Maurer and gives a precise spoiling knowledge sufficient to obtain chain rule for min-entropy. Our main result in this part of the paper is the following (see Lemma 3):
Chain rule. Let X, Y be random variables. Then, there exists a function Hint(y) ∈ {1, . . . , K} for some K > 0 such that for any ε > 0 and N = H ∞ (X, Y ) the event:
occurs with probability ≥ 1 − K · 2 −εN over the choice of h.
As a corollary, we significantly generalize this result in order to obtain the chain rule for many variables (see Corollary 2) . To the best of our knowledge, prior to this work there was no efficient chain rule for min-entropy except Lemma 1 (see Dodis et al. [9] or Cachin and Maurer [6] for similar results for Renyi entropy).
It is important to mention that in any cryptographic application supplementary side information appears to be beneficial for the adversary and therefore using Lemma 3 should facilitate any security proof requiring detailed treatment of minentropy (cf. Remark after proof of Lemma 5).
Usefulness of Chain rule. Our result seems to help to prove some facts that often look trivial at very first sight. The typical problem with proving such "obvious observations" comes from the fact that, in general, the chain rule for min-entropy is false. For example one may go through the proof of Lemma 5.2 from [5] to see how technical and delicate it is. We believe that using chain rule from this paper could significantly simplify reasonings like that. The reason for that is that our statement seems to work better then e.g. Lemma A.1 (min-entropy split) from [5] that is key for proving Lemma 5.2. The technical cause for that raises from the fact that Brakerski et al. split somehow the min-entropy of a pair but do not have full control of min-entropy of one of the elements. That makes the proof much harder in one case. Our techniques tend to follow the ideas from [5] and make them more clean to use.
Another good example for usefulness for our chain rule is Lemma 4 from this paper. Here we need the multivariate case of our result (Corollary 2) which was not considered in previous works at all.
Preliminaries
We assume the existence of a random oracle, i.e., perfectly random function H : {0, 1} * → {0, 1} n which can be evaluated only by querying a certain oracle H . At the beginning, all values of H are uniformly distributed, in particular, unpredictable. Throughout the protocols operation, one can issue a query H(m) obtaining the value of H(m) and gaining no other information.
In order to model leakage attacks, we introduce a restricted leakage oracle
|D| → {0, 1} λ given as a Turing machine, and results in the value
is defined analogously but with leakage functions containing apart from ordinary operations a black-box access to a random oracle, which on an input x returns the value H(x). We say that the total leakage is of at most λ bits if the sum i λ i for all issued
λi is bounded by λ.
We denote by TM We say that a function f is H-randomized (or simply randomized if no confusion can arise) if it is result is dependent on a certain random oracle H. We denote a H-randomized function by f (−, H).
Chain rule for min-entropy
Bivariate case
We first prove the following case for two random variables. 
Proof. We begin with two straightforward facts concerning min-entropy. Firstly, observe that for any random variable Z and an event E the conditional min-entropy
. Secondly, using the formula for conditional probability we see that
which means that
This consequently implies that H
We now proceed to the proof of Lemma 3. We define a function Hint by the condition:
where N denotes the min-entropy H ∞ (X, Y ) (we disregard the boundary cases).
By the definition of Hint we see that
Moreover, using both of the above general observations, we get that
By summing (2) and (4.1) up we obtain:
Now observe that for all values i of Hint that satisfy Pr(Hint = i) ≥ 2 −εN we have:
There are at most K other values of Hint which consequently occurs with probability smaller than K · 2 −εN . This finishes the proof.
Remark 2.
For the sake of brevity, from now on we omit the ∀ quantifier and write H ∞ (X; Y = y, Hint = h) to denote the fact that y is consistent with the value h of a random variable Hint = Hint(Y ). Then, with the same assumptions as above, we have 1 :
for any event E depending only on Y with probability ≥ 1 − K · 2 −εN over the choice of h. This follows from averaging over the choice of y. Note that the subtlety of definition of conditional min-entropy given in [9] is not relevant as the formula (4.1) works for any y such that Hint(y) = h.
As corollaries we obtain: Corollary 1. Let X, Y be random variables satisfying H ∞ (X, Y ) = mn. For every ∆ ∈ N such that there exists a random variable Hint such that: 
Multivariate case
Moreover, by more involved inductive considerations we obtain: 
with probability 1−2D ( −k)·2 
Proof (Proof of the claim).
The base case k = is just the assumption H ∞ (X 1 , . . . , X ) = s for an empty variable Hint (note that there is no additional assumption on further conditioning). Now, assume that the claim is true for some k > 1 and that
for any event E depending on Y with probability 1 − 2D c i · 2
over the choice of h . We now set Hint
) and compute that
with probability
where in (8) we used the definition of Y , in (9) we applied the formula (7) and in (10) we removed additional conditioning on event H k Hint k = g which depends only on variables with smaller indices (induction step) and is therefore harmless (cf. hypothesis of the claim). The inductive claim concerning additional conditioning follows along the same lines (just by adding further events in min-entropies), but is a bit cumbersome to state succinctly.
Our corollary follows from the claim for k = 1 and the inequality −1 < 1, i.e., the expected Hint equals Hint 1 .
Remark 3. The proof above shows that the size of Hint is in fact polynomial in and D.
We now state an elementary proposition which allows us to obtain a certain bound on the number of high min-entropy blocks given H ∞ (X 1 , . . . , X ) ≥ β n for β ≤ 1. Let x 1 , . . . , x be a sequence of numbers satisfying 0 ≤ x i ≤ n and x 1 + · · · + x = β n for some 0 < β ≤ 1. Then, for any 0 ≤ γ < β there are more than
Proposition 1.
A proof of this fact appears in Appendix C. As a corollary we obtain: Proof. For the general case, we consequently use Corollary 2 and Proposition 1. We obtain the special case by direct specialization.
Key derivation procedure based on sensitive data
In this chapter, we define formally a class of protocols whose security can be expressed in terms of a game with a certain probability of success. Consequently, we define two properties, security and privacy, of a randomised transformation function kdp(−, H) which makes it suitable for derivation of keys from sensitive disk data.
Security games
Definition 1 (Security game). Let K be a random variable. A security game against an adversary A based on randomness K is a tuple Game = (C, KeyGen, Setup Ch , Setup Adv , Execute) consisting of an interactive algorithm C together with a randomized key generation procedure KeyGen, a pair of setup procedures Setup Ch , Setup Adv and an execution procedure Execute which given an interactive algorithm A operates as described in Fig. 1 below. Execution procedure Execute of Game = (C, KeyGen, Setup Ch , Setup Adv ).
1. The key is initialized by key ← KeyGen(K) and then the input tapes of A and C are set to Setup Adv (key) and Setup Ch (key) respectively. 3. When C transits to either Accept or Reject the execution terminates.
Output:
The final state state C ∈ {Accept, Reject} of the challenger C. Intuitively, the operation of Game[A C, key ← KeyGen(K)] boils down to an adaptive, sequential (numbered by round) exchange of messages between interactive machines A and C initialized by the values Setup Adv (key) and Setup Ch (key) respectively, which ends up in the last state of the algorithm C.
Remark 4 (Complexity).
We can require that C or A belong to a certain complexity class TM which might be characterized by number of Turing machine steps allowed to be taken, access to some oracle O (e.g., hash, leakage) or a memory bound. For example, to describe an adversary which works in time polynomial in the size of the key key and can access leakage oracle O(key) with a leakage bound λ, we write that A ∈ TM O(key) λ (poly(|key|). While computing any kind of complexity (e.g. time, storage, leakage), as a final result we consider the total amount of resources used during all transitions conducted (cf., e.g., line 3 and 4 above) in an interactive algorithm. In particular, an adversary A belongs to TM O(key) λ if the total amount of leakage obtained during all transitions of A does not exceed λ bits.
Remark 5 (Relation to classical Interactive Turing Machines).
In fact the definition given above is a RAM-based analogue of interactive Turing machines. We resigned from the formal approach based on common input tapes assumption in order to emphasize the sequential nature of the computation, which we shall exploit in the upcoming considerations.
The above security game is tailored to cover a broad range of security definitions of various cryptographic protocols. We now state the description of a class of cryptographic protocols whose security is grasped through game-based definition.
Definition 2 (Game security).
We say that Game = (C, KeyGen, Setup Ch , Setup Adv , Execute) based on randomness K is (ε, TM)-secure iff for every A ∈ TM the probability that execution ends in Accept satisfies
where the probability is taken over K and all random choices of C and A.
Example 3. The vast majority of cryptographic protocols are covered by the above game-based definition. Good example is identification scheme in BRM from [1] . Another protocol that fits the definition is described in the introduction standard Merkle-tree authentication protocol.
Note, that the notation ε for the security parameter might be confusing as we do not distinguish the case of unpredictability and indistinguishability applications (see [10] for precise definitions), i.e., the security definition above covers the case of ε ≈ 0 and ε ≈ 
Security and privacy of key derivation functions
After describing what security games are, we are ready to formulate precise definitions for intuitive requirements of privacy and security that we impose on our key-derivation procedure. From now on, D is a random variable representing disk data, λ denotes the number of bits adversary can leak, N is the maximal value of min-entropy of disk data and p is the ratio of actual min-entropy H ∞ (D) and N . operating on key = kdp(D, H), the output distributions satisfy:
Definition 3 (privacy of a key-derivation procedure). We say that a randomized function kdp(−, H)
The privacy definition tracks down the amount of additional leakage ∆ λ that is necessary to constructor S capable of simulating the behaviour of any adversary A O,H λ,q operating on the key generated by the dispersing procedure. Observe that any algorithm A(key) ∈ TM O(D),H λ,q (cf. Section 3 for the formal specification of this complexity class) is provided with access to an oracle H, i.e., can test values of a random function, and moreover issues a sequence of leakage queries O D,H (f i ), which may also depend on the random oracle H, i.e., can learn some information concerning D depending on the same random function H.
Definition 4 (Security of a key-derivation procedure). We say that a randomized function kdp(−, H)
The general aim of the security definition is to grasp the intuitive expectation that the an adversary playing against key derived from sensitive data should not gain any advantage comparing to the case of using a redundant, truly random key. Note that it suffices to give A the access to key = kdp(D, H) as the transcript of any scheme's execution can be generated based on key. 
i.e. the sets of size K expands into sets of size at least L.
2 for detailed description of Game see Definition 1
We often make use of explicit (1 − η) )-dispersers. We implicitly assume that the numbers d, e satisfy d < 1, e < 1 and d + e > 1. For more details on dispersers and further definitions see Appendix B.
In the Fig. 2 , we describe function Disperse explicitly. For the sake of simplicity, we identify vertices of graph with labels they contain. An exemplary Disperse function is shown in Fig. 3 .
Implementation of Disperse
n Output: a bitstring D .
Execution:
1. Assign values to the "upper" vertices of G σ : 
Fig. 3. An exemplary Disperse Gσ (D, H)
We now state our main result that for an appropriately chosen graph G σ the function Disperse Gσ is in fact private and secure for reasonable parameters.
n is:
Since the proof of this theorem is long, it is divided into three parts -at the beginning it is shown that even under the presence of leakage, function Disperse effectively hides the data underneath; then, basing on this result, privacy property is proven; next security is shown. At the end, we also shortly elaborate about the efficiency of Disperse Gσ .
Before proceeding to actual proofs we shortly elaborate about the bounds on the parameters.
Remark 6 (Efficiency of Disperse Gσ ).
It is important to note that in order to obtain a single bit of a derived key one need process d blocks of disk data. This therefore constitutes a leakage-time trade-off for the operation of our function. Namely reduction of d allows to compute a single bit of key more efficiently with a cost of an increased parameter ∆ λ proportional to e (recall that d + e > 1).
Remark 7 (Bounds on parameters).
The bounds p − λ n > β, resp. β > 4η express natural requirements that leakage ratio λ n should not exceed the actual ratio p, resp. the quality of disperser η should be superior to the entropy reserve represented by p − λ n . The bound on q = 2 o( 1−e )n corresponds to a robust, exponential bound on the random oracle query-based complexity of an adversary.
One-wayness of Disperse
The Disperse procedure possesses a certain one-wayness property expressed in the following lemma. We precede it with a necessary definition.
Definition 6 (Bad query). Given a random variable D, a bipartite right d-regular graph G σ and a random oracle H we say that a random oracle query H(b), submitted by some Turing Machine A, is bad if the argument b equals
(i, D σ i 1 D σ i 2 . . . D σ i d ) for some i ∈ {1, . . . , }, i.e.,
the argument of random oracle query equals one of the values defined by graph G σ and a random variable D.
By Bad A we denote the set of all bad queries. By indices A we denote a list of all pairs (k, i k ) of indices k ∈ {1, . . . , q} and i k ∈ {1, . . . , } such that k is the smallest index of a bad random oracle query of A which is equal to (i k , D σ i k 1
. . . D σ i k δ
). Since the total number of queries is q and G σ has 2 vertices, we can describe the list indices A using |indices A | · (log + log q) bits.
Lemma 4 (One-wayness of Disperse
n be a random variable of min-entropy p n. Then, the probability that an algorithm
makes at least e different bad queries satisfies:
Proof. Due to technical nature the proof is deferred to Appendix A.2.
Privacy of Disperse
In this section we show that Disperse is in fact a private key-derivation procedure. The bottom line of the proof is an application of one-wayness together with a careful design of leakage query. It is important to note that we significantly use our computational model, where we can submit potentially non-polynomial queries.
Theorem 2 (Privacy
n be a random variable of min-entropy p n. (D, H) , the output distributions satisfy:
1−e )n and any β satisfying p − λ n > β > 4η.
In order to give a proof, we shall construct a machine S such that for any ad-
We precede the construction by an essential transformation of random oracles and leakage functions, which plays a role of random oracle re-programming. 1 , v 1 ) , . . . , (arg k , v k ) be a list of pairs of an argument arg i together with a potential value v i . We define a twisted random oracle H{L} to be an oracle whose operation is described as follows:
Definition 7 (Twisted random oracle). Let H be a random oracle and L = (arg
In particular, given a random variable D, a random oracle H and a random vari- Before giving a formal proof of statistical indistinguishability of output distributions, we give some claryifing remarks about consecutive steps of the construction. Firstly, we should emphasize that in
Step (2) we crucially use the properties of our leakage model by querying leakage oracle with potentially non-polynomial function simulating whole behaviour of A. Secondly, observe that in Step (2) the simulator leaks only the indices of queries, not their actual arguments as those can be observed during Step (3) of simulation. Thirdly, note that in Step (3a) we need not perform any additional leakage apart from the value of f , as f {D Gσ − − → K} can be obtained inside the leakage query as in Step (2) . Therefore the leakage excess consists merely of the list indices A and consequently ∆λ = |indices A |(log q + log ).
Proof (Proof of Theorem 2).
We shall now argue that the simulator S constructed above satisfies the requirements of Theorem 2 for any adversary A. Concretely, we prove that S perfectly simulates the execution of any adversary A, unless |indices A | ≥ e . Therefore, for any adversary A the output's distribution of S(A) satisfies:
Implementation of the simulator S.
1. S initializes a random oracle H, i.e., creates a table H of uniformly random values associated to all inputs of H (or use OracleQueryList). Moreover, it draws a random variable K ← U n . 2. S initializes the random tape of A to a fixed sequence of uniformly random bits and then queries the leakage oracle with the Turing machine ind : {0, 1} |D| → {0, 1}
* which operates as follows:
Operation of ind:
Description of the function Simulate the execution of A(K) step by step with random oracle queries H substituted with H{D Gσ − − → K}. Every time the adversary A issues a leakage oracle query given by a Turing machine f , the simulator S provides her with a result of a twisted leakage function f {D 3. S executes A(K) with a previously initialized (see Step (2)) random tape and H sampled above (see Step (1)), and then runs it step by step with the following exceptions:
(a) When A issues a leakage query given by a Turing machine f , the simulator S substitutes it with a twisted leakage function f {D Gσ − − → K}. (b) S keeps track of the number k of random oracle queries issued to H and every time it appears in a pair (k, i k ) ∈ indices A , replaces the value returned by H with K ik . Moreover, it stores the arguments a k of queries appearing in the list indices A and substitutes the value of H with K ik every time a k appears as an argument.
Fig. 4. Implementation of Simulator
where ε = Pr(|indices A | ≥ e ). Firstly, note that the execution of A inside the leakage function ind u (see Step (2)) is perfectly equivalent to an honest execution of A as H{D Gσ − − → K} is distributed equally to H. Consequently, the actual simulation given in Step (3) differs from a perfect simulation only by the condition on |indices A |, as its perfectly equivalent to the one performed during simulators leakage phase. This condition forces the return of ⊥ instead of appropriate indices A with probability Pr(|indices A | ≥ e ) = ε. Consequently, we bound ε by a factor negligible (in a certain sense) in the security parameters. Directly by applying Lemma 4 for an adversary A we see that:
This completes the proof.
Security of Disperse
Again, based on one-wanness of Disperse we prove that our function satisfies the security requirements. We have the following:
Theorem 3 (Security). Let Game = (C, id, Setup Ch , Setup Adv , Execute) 3 be an ε-secure game based on randomness K ∼ U n for the class of adversaries TM
Proof. Here, we omit the proof as it is technical and its main idea is analogous to the one presented in the proof of privacy. For the details see Appendix A.3. The high-level idea is to use reduction and apply Lemma 4 to bound the success probability.
A Proofs of lemmata and theorems
A.1 Technical lemma
Here, we state a technical lemma that is a broad generalization of Lemma B.1 given in the work by Dziembowski, Kazana, and Wichs [13] and leads us to the proof of the main part of our work, i.e., Lemma 4 and its consequences. The statement may not look very interesting on its own: it is rather a wrapper for Corollary 2 and Corollary 3 stated in such a way that it will be directly used to prove Lemma 4. Similar idea was originally used in [13] .
We start with a definition of a Guessing game which is tailored to be used in proof of Lemma 4 (intuitevely it describes exactly skills of adversary what we will deal with later). Guessing game for adversary A.
Input: random variables (X, H), where X = (X 1 , . . . , X ) and H = (H v1 , . . . , H vN ) for some parameters , N and labels v i .
a Furthermore we declare k 1 , k 2 , leakage parameter λ Leak and p such that X has min-entropy at least p log N .
Leakage phase:
1. A issues a leakage query Leak(X 1 , . . . , X , H) of length λ Leak . 
Second phase:
4. A receives all values of {X i |i / ∈ S 1 }, i.e., all blocks that she did not try to guess. 5. A outputs a subset of labels S 2 ⊂ {v i } i=1..N of size k 2 which were not previously (i.e., in the first phase) queried along with guesses for all values (H v |v ∈ S 2 ).
a The values of Xi should be considered as certain H labels. (X 1 , . . . , X ) = p n for some 0 ≤ p ≤ 1.
Now let A be a randomized algorithm playing Guessing game with λ Leak = λn. Then, the probability that A outputs all correct guesses (in both phases) is at most
and p < N , for any ε > 0 and β < p.
tional information may only help") is the major motivation for our definition of spoiling knowledge chain rule for min-entropy. and
βln, then the probability that A outputs all correct guesses is at most:
Proof. Here we just use Corollary 3: after learning Leak(X) and Hint(X) with probability at least 1 − 4 ( − 1)2 −βn/4 there are at least
blocks of min-entropy of at least βn/4. The algorithm A is supposed to guess more than − β 4 blocks so at least one block with min-entropy βn/4 is supposed to be guessed. This happens with probability at most 2 −βn/4 and therefore by the union bound and the inequality 4 ( − 1) + 1 ≤ 4
2 we obtain the claim. As described in remark above, here we also assume that A learns both Leak(X) and Hint(X).
A.2 Proof of one-wayness of Disperse
Here, we shall use the Guessing game defined in Appendix A. Proof. Given an adversary A such that its associated list indices A is longer or equal to e with probability ξ we construct a player P A in game
; satisfied for large enough by the assumption on β
winning with probability ξ. Therefore, we conclude that
by Lemma 5 in Appendix A.1. The detailed construction of P A is described in Fig. 6 .
Implementation of a player P A .
Learning phase: 
Game phase:
The adversary A is now executed with the following recipe for answering to leakage and oracle queries:
1. The answers to leakage queries are obtained using Leak(D, H).
2. The random oracle queries are obtained using H with an exception of elements The first step is to show that a player P A follows the rules of the game:
For this sake, we show that:
-Length of hint λ Leak = |Leak(D 1 , . . . , D , H)| is not greater than leakage λ of the adversary A along with n bits needed to feed the A and e (log q + log ) to handle bad queries. Hence λ Leak = λ + n + e (log q + log ).
-Rules of the game requires that k 1 > − β 4 , which follows from the assumptions on β. Now, we need to show that P A : a) guesses at least k 1 elements in the first phase with probability ξ and b) guesses k 2 = elements in the second phase. 
). This follows from simple observations that: ε is arbitrary,
1−e )n ) and
A.3 Proof of security of Disperse
Theorem 4 (Security). Let Game = (C, id, Setup Ch , Setup Adv , Execute) 4 be an ε-secure game based on randomness K ∼ U n for the class of adversaries TM Using A as a component, we construct an adversary A ∈ TM O(K) λ contradicting (ε, TM O(K) )-security of Game based on randomness K. Its description is given in Fig. 7 . Note that we shall freely use the twisted random oracles defined in Definition 7.
To finish the proof we need the following claims. difference is that the leakage and random oracle queries of A Internal are not processed honestly but simulated by means of leakage of A described in steps (3a) and (3b) in Fig. 7 .
Claim (Simulation
Claim (Simulation's correctness). The simulation above is faithful (i.e., A works the same as corresponding A Internal ) unless ⊥ is returned in part (3c) of simulation. This occurs with probability ξ = Pr(|indices| > e ) and therefore Pr(A Internal is faithfully simulated) = 1 − Pr(|indices| > e ) = 1 − ξ.
Proof. The first part concerning simulation correctness is clear from the construction. More precisely, the difference between messages of honest A Internal and A occurs only if the restriction λ on the size of leakage (see (3c)) intervenes. Therefore we are left to prove that Pr(⊥ is returned in (3c)) = ξ. This follows directly by applying Lemma 4 for A Internal .
Claim (Leakage bound).
The total leakage of A during the execution of Game(A C, key ← K) does not exceed λ bits and consequently A belongs to TM
Proof. Clear, as we have explicitly bounded the leakage inside A (see (3c) in Fig. 7 ).
All above claims prove that A is an efficient adversary for Game which succeeds with probability:
Pr(G = Accept) Pr(G = Accept and A Internal is correctly simulated) (13) Pr(G = Accept) + Pr(A Internal is correctly simulated) − 1
= ε + (1 − ξ) − 1 = ε − ξ > ε, (15) where in line (13) we used (Simulation) claim and in (15) 
B Disperser graphs
Here, we present some structure theorems concerning so-called disperser graphs, which allows us to amplify privacy and security properties of the above constructions. We do not claim originality of the upcoming considerations. Similar arguments appear for example in [18, 26] . Despite this, we were not able to find the results of Corollary 4 in literature. Let G = (V, E) be an undirected graph with the set of vertices V and edges E. For a subset S ⊂ V by N (S) we denote {w ∈ V : ∃ s∈S (s, w) ∈ E}, i.e. the set of all neighbours of S. We say that a bipartite graph G = (V We shall use the following simple lemma which describes expansion properties of bipartite graphs. which is equivalent to the proposition.
The existence of an efficiently computable function Ext (we require efficient computability in order to instantiate G Ext effectively), satisfying the assumptions of Proposition 2 follows from the result proven in [16] :
